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The transparency of the fiscal performance of governments has attracted attention from 
researchers, policy-makers and practitioners around the world. This study examines the 
determinants of fiscal transparency in the city-level governments of China, which has 
become a key issue in the drive to modernise the Chinese state. Employing cross-
sectional data from the 2017 Statistical Yearbooks published by the official statistical 
institutions and the 2017 Fiscal transparency report of city-level governments edited by 
the Tsinghua University, this study finds that economic development, economic 
openness, and dependence on transfer payments are associated with weaker fiscal 
transparency. Large cities, those with high levels of internet usage and cities higher up 
within the Chinese administrative hierarchy are associated with stronger fiscal 
transparency. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. 
 
Key words: fiscal transparency, local government, China, principal-agent theory 
 
Forthcoming in Local Government Studies 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Introduction 
Public administration scholars argue that transparency can ensure the legitimacy of the 
government by optimising public services performance, reducing corruption, and 
enhancing people’ trust in the government (Alt, Lassen, and Rose 2006; Heald 2003). 
Critically, fiscal transparency (FT) is considered a pivotal dimension of administrative 
transparency (Kopits and Craig 1998), because public policies are usually supported by 
public funds provided by taxpayers. Moreover, during the 1990s, a series of financial 
scandals in public organisations around the world lead to a stronger emphasis on 
strengthening government accountability through fiscal information disclosure and 
communication (Rubin 1996). Although knowledge on the determinants of FT has been 
steadily accumulating (Wehner and Renzio 2013), we need to know more about FT in 
local governments within developing countries, especially in non-western settings, such 
as China, which may display distinctive patterns of transparency. We aim to apply the 
classic principal-agent approach to the FT of Chinese city governments, and identify 
determinants of FT that have been under-analysed in previous research.   
According to principal-agent theory, citizens can be considered principals in their 
relationships with government bureaucrats who should ideally act as their agents in 
promoting public welfare (Alt, Lassen, and Rose 2006). However, principals and agents 
both seek to maximise their own interests, and in the case of citizens and bureaucrats 
there are substantial asymmetries in information and capability between the two sides. 
As a result, the two groups tend to have divergent perspectives on the provision of fiscal 
information, and the respective factors shaping citizens’ demand for, and bureaucrats 
supply, of fiscal information may differ greatly. 
The findings from previous studies of FT from different countries might not be 
generalisable to China, due to the absence of partisan electoral competition (Wu and 
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Wang 2012). Therefore, while principal-agent theory may still apply in the Chinese 
context, it is necessary to supplement this perspective with ideas from legitimacy theory 
about the indicators of good government the authorities in China may prefer to use to 
incentivise bureaucrats, especially economic growth, which if positive may reduce the 
pressure on city governments to disclose fiscal information (Chen et al. 2017). The above 
argument does not mean that citizens’ i terest in government information has no impact 
on FT in Chinese cities, but that it might be more influential if conditions are favourable 
for both citizens and the government to demand and supply fiscal information. As a result, 
determinants of FT that have been comparatively neglected in prior research might matter, 
particularly factors related to transformation of the Chinese economy and society. For 
instance, urbanisation is rarely mentioned in Western transparency studies, but could 
increase demand for FT in China, where the urban population rate has increased from 
36% to 58% in the past 20 years (National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC 2018). 
Likewise, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and internet usage may also increase the 
demand for FT in the Chinese context, where information asymmetry between 
government and other actors tends to be more serious than in other countries (Yim and 
Jung 2016).  
Consistent with the aims of this study, we therefore ask: what economic, 
demographic, fiscal and institutional factors are related to FT in city-level governments 
in China? Following the introduction, previous FT studies are reviewed, and hypotheses 
about the determinants of FT in Chinese local government are developed based around 
the adaptation of principal-agent and legitimacy theory. The methods section presents 
the research design, the selected sample, the variables and the data sources. The results 
of statistical analysis are then reported, and Shapley-value decomposition is employed to 
identify the contributions made by different explanatory variables to changes in FT. 
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Following that, the findings are discussed, and the conclusion section summarises the 
contributions and limitations of the study, along with recommendations for further 
research. 
 
Determinants of FT in Chinese local governments  
According to Kopits and Craig (1998), FT implies that public organisations fully disclose 
information in relation to “government structure and functions, fiscal policies and 
activities, public sector accounts, and projections”. Efforts to promote FT by the IMF 
(2007), the OECD (2001) and the International Budget Partnership (a transnational NGO) 
have led fiscal information disclosure to become a legal requirement at all levels of 
government in many developed countries, such as the UK (HM Treasury 1998), Spain 
(Esteller-Moré and Otero 2012), and the USA (Alt, Lassen, and Skilling 2002). It has 
also become a statutory obligation in China, but, to date, researchers have mainly 
investigated determinants of FT at the provincial government level (Deng, Peng, and 
Wang 2013). To understand the determinants of FT in Chinese city-level governments, 
we bring together insights from principal-agent and legitimacy theory that have guided 
previous studies of FT at the local level (e.g. Bolívar, Muñoz, and Hernández 2013).  
Principal-agent theory indicates that citizens and incumbents in the government 
can be respectively considered as agents and principals (Alt et al. 2006), with citizens 
the principals, and politicians and public servants the agents. Theoretically, agents 
(bureaucrats in the government) should advance the interests of their principals (citizens) 
rather than their own interests. However, information asymmetry can enable bureaucrats 
to maximise their interests in ways that do not benefit citizens – what is termed the 
agency problem (Zimmerman 1977). Alleviation of the agency problem relies on 
mechanisms that allow citizens to monitor government activity, such as the publication 
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of fiscal information. For citizens, two positive “countervailing effects” may arise from 
greater FT (Alt and Lassen 2006): firstly, it can help citizens to identify “good” agents 
(politicians and bureaucrats); secondly, it can limit the rent-seeking behaviour and 
opportunistic decision-making of “bad” agents. 
In China, although there are no routine processes for citizens to hold politicians 
to account, there are still various incentives for local bureaucrats to maximise citizens’ 
interests by promoting FT. As Yang (2004) highlights, FT can be used as an indicator to 
measure the achievements of local bureaucrats. Personnel changes in Chinese local 
governments are largely determined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and higher-
level government (Chung 2016; Chen et al. 2017). Establishing a service-oriented 
government has become policy for the CCP, and providing governmental information 
can be considered a way to achieve this (Li 2016). Hence, it may be in the interests of 
local bureaucrats to promote FT to demonstrate their capability and loyalty to the CCP. 
This perspective on FT can be explained by legitimacy theory (Zimmerman 1977).  
Zhu (2011) highlights that the legitimacy of unelected governments can be 
enhanced through good performance and governance. While the Chinese authorities have 
mostly relied on economic development as a source of legitimacy (Schubert 2008),
information disclosure may become a more significant source of legitimacy if local 
economic conditions are unfavourable (Zeng 2014).  
In practice, levels of FT reflect agents’ and principals’ assessment of the benefits 
versus the costs of disclosing fiscal information (Alt and Lassen 2006). From a public 
choice perspective, bureaucrats and politicians, could regard lower information 
asymmetry as a cost of promoting transparency (Mueller 1976; Guillamón et al. 2011). 
In a similar vein, high search costs can reduce citizens’ demand for transparency (Chan 
and Rubin 1987). Since it is difficult for Chinese citizens to influence local politicians 
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through direct elections or to “vote with their feet” under the household registration 
system (Chan 2010), FT might depend more on the incentives for bureaucrats to change 
their behaviour. Following prior research at the local government level (e.g. Bolívar, 
Muñoz, and Hernández 2013; Sol 2013), the potential determinants of FT in Chinese 
city-level governments examined here are therefore divided into four key types of factor: 
economic; demographic; fiscal; and, institutional.  
 
Economic determinants of FT 
From a principal-agent theory perspective, economic determinants of FT impact on 
citizens and bureaucrats because they are ever-present influences on their attitudes and 
behaviours (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007). Hence, it is anticipated that economic 
development, the openness of the local economy and the relative economic well-being 
of citizens is likely to influence FT in Chinese city governments. 
 
Economic development 
Researchers claim that economic development can bring about a higher level of FT, 
because wealthier regions are able to establish institutions, which protect people’s right 
to know and to participate in public debates (Bastida and Benito 2007; Schick 2003). 
Moreover, affluent taxpayers have a stronger sense of their rights and may demand more 
FT to better monitor how their tax monies are spent (Guillamón, Bastida, and Benito 
2011). Several studies confirm that the supply and demand for FT g ows with economic 
prosperity (e.g. Cicatiello, Simone, and Gaeta 2017; Wehner and Renzio 2013). However, 
some researchers claim that citizens in less developed economies or experiencing 
economic downturns are more motivated to exert pressure on governments to improve 
transparency (e.g. Rios, Bastida, and Benito 2016; Grigorescu 2003; Zeng 2014). From 
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the perspective of legitimacy theory, economic development and FT might also be 
negatively related in China because the authorities and citizens regard economic 
development as a more important indicator of legitimacy than transparency. Opaque 
fiscal information may therefore be acceptable when economic growth is favourable, but 
become more politically salient when economic difficulties occur. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Economic development is negatively related to FT in Chinese city-level 
governments  
 
Economic openness 
Previous research (e.g. Deng, Peng, and Wang 2013) has found that foreign investors are 
more sensitive to information asymmetry than local investors. Accordingly, the more 
important the role that FDI plays in a region, the more likely that local governments may 
be under pressure from foreign investors to increase FT. It is expected that this argument 
will still hold true within the unique Chinese context since there are large variations in 
economic openness across China (Tisdell 2009). Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Economic openness is positively related to FT in Chinese city-level 
governments. 
 
Unemployment 
Tejedo-Romero and Araujo (2018) argue that high unemployment represents a poor 
economic situation, which motivates local bureaucrats to conceal fiscal performance 
from the public in order to maintain social stability and their position in government. 
Zuccolotto and Teixeira (2014) contend that high unemployment is associated with lower 
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average incomes and tax burdens, which renders citizens less interested in how 
government spends their money. Although unemployment might increase citizens’ 
dissatisfaction with government and prompt complaints about an absence of transparency, 
policy changes in China are largely driven top-down by the ruling party. Hence, cities 
with high unemployment will likely have lower levels of FT. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Unemployment is negatively related to FT in Chinese city-level 
governments. 
 
Demographic determinants of FT 
Demographic features of an area can impact on FT, because they may shape people’s 
demand for government information and their capacity to influence local policies 
(Andreula and Chong 2016). Following previous studies, we consider population size, 
education level, and the income of local residents, plus the level of urbanisation. 
 
Size of urban population  
Identified by most empirical studies of fiscal transparency (e.g. Caamaño-Alegre et al. 
2013; Guillamón, Bastida, and Benito 2011), a larger population size can bring about 
greater transparency. From a principal-agent perspective, the number of public service 
users and the amount of tax payment are positively linked with population size (de Araujo 
and Tejedo-Romero 2016; Alcaraz-Quiles, Navarro-Galera, and Ortiz-Rodríguez 2014), 
while information disclosure can be an effective means of reducing agency costs paid by 
citizens (Zhou et al. 2018). Simultaneously, researchers (e.g. Ríos, Benito and Bastida 
2013) also imply that potential conflicts caused by information asymmetry might be more 
serious in larger cities. Therefore, with the expansion of population size, both the 
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motivations for citizens and the government to promote fiscal transparency might 
become stronger. In China there is a vast urban-rural gap in residents’ level of education 
and income (Wu and He 2016), and most rural residents are not taxpayers (Shi and Ye 
2018), indicating that their demand for fiscal information is likely to be extremely limited. 
To better capture the principal-agent relationship in city governments, this research 
specifically focuses on the number of urban residents in an area. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Urban population size is positively related to FT in Chinese city-level 
governments. 
 
Urbanisation  
Andreula and Chong (2016) argue that urbanisation increases the quantity and 
complexity of public service demands. Since the expansion of public services relies on 
taxpayer monies (Robinson 2007), citizens’ demand for fiscal information might increase 
in line with urbanisation. Although scant research has explicitly addressed urbanization 
and FT in local governments, the following is advanced:  
 
Hypothesis 5: Urbanisation is positively related to FT in Chinese city-level governments.  
 
Education level  
Well-educated citizens are more likely to be aware of the importance and benefits of 
information disclosure (Harrison and Sayogo 2014). A larger proportion of well-
educated residents living in a city can not only reduce the costs of disclosing fiscal 
information, but also indicate that there might be more citizens and interest groups with 
enthusiasm for FT (Ingram 1984). In other words, education levels might increase 
10 
 
citizens’ demand for information and reduce resistance to information disclosure (Rios, 
Benito, and Bastida 2013). Accordingly: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Education is positively related to FT in Chinese city-level governments.  
 
Internet usage 
Rios, Benito, and Bastida (2013) claim that internet usage is positively related to the level 
of FT. This is because the internet enables the government and citizens to provide and 
acquire fiscal information in a convenient and cost-effective way (Muñoz, Bolívar, and 
Hernández 2017). In other words, the willingness to supply and demand fiscal 
information can be increased by a higher level of internet and E-government usage 
(Gallego-Álvarez, Rodríguez-Domínguez, and García-Sánchez 2010; Mergel 2013).
Since this variable is associated with bureaucrats (the agents) and citizens (the principals), 
it is likely that it has a strong impact within the Chinese context. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Internet usage is positively related to FT in Chinese city-level governments. 
 
Fiscal determinants of FT  
Fiscal determinants of FT alter bureaucrats’ incentive to disclose fiscal information. The 
impacts of fiscal status on transparency have been widely studied by researchers utilising 
a principal-agent framework. Central to this approach has been a focus on fiscal deficits 
and government dependence upon external revenue sources.  
 
Fiscal surplus/deficit 
Researchers usually claim that a fiscal surplus will be positively related to FT, since a 
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surplus suggests that incumbents spend public money efficiently and that the costs to 
them of disclosing fiscal information are small (Alt, Lassen, and Rose 2006; Caamaño-
Alegre et al. 2013). By contrast, Cicatiello, Simone, and Gaeta (2017) suggest that there 
could be a positive relationship between fiscal deficit and transparency since a perception 
of poor fiscal performance might amplify voters’ demand for fiscal information. 
However, if the deficit ratio far exceeds expectations, bureaucrats seem more likely to 
be motivated to conceal information to maintain their positions and status in government 
(Andreula and Chong 2016). As the deficit ratio is well-known to fiscal information 
providers and users, it is expected that the above argument will hold true within the 
Chinese context. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 8: A fiscal deficit is negatively related to FT in Chinese city-level 
governments. 
 
Dependence on unconditional transfer payments  
Dependence on transfer payments might motivate funding providers (e.g. the central 
government or international organisations) to closely monitor usage of those payments 
(Bolívar, Muñoz, and Hernández 2013). Accordingly, funding users could be required to 
disclose more fiscal information to the public (Ingram and DeJong 1987) – a perspective 
confirmed by Guillamón, Bastida, and Benito (2011) and Bastida and Benito (2007). 
However, researchers (e.g. Baldissera et al., 2018) also suggest that reliance on transfer 
payments might reduce FT due to the ‘flypaper effect’, because unlike tax revenues, 
transfer payments (especially unconditional grants), can be more easily r tained within 
local governments (Liu and Zhao 2011). Intergovernmental transfers may thereby 
promote citizens’ wellbeing less than expected (Lee and Vuletin 2012), possibly 
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motivating bureaucrats to conceal relevant information. Moreover, reliance on 
unconditional transfer payments reduces tax effort and therefore citizens’ interest in local 
governments (Liu and Zhang 2011), undermining the principal-agent relationship 
between citizens and the government. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 9: Dependence on unconditional transfer payments is negatively related to 
FT in Chinese city-level governments.  
 
Dependence on non-tax revenues  
Dependence on other non-tax revenues might also affect FT. If local governments are 
more reliant on non-tax revenues (e.g. commercial income and penalty charges), the 
principal-agent relationship between taxpayers and the government can be weakened. 
Government officials might then consider it unnecessary to fully disclose fiscal 
information to local residents who contribute less to the revenue stream (Brautigam, 
Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008). This seems likely to apply in China, where a competitive 
electoral system does not exist, and tax is a critical link between taxpayers (principals) 
and their agent (the government). Accordingly: 
 
Hypothesis 10: Dependence on non-tax revenues is negatively related to FT in Chinese 
city-level governments.  
 
Institutional determinants of FT 
Recent studies have considered the impacts of political and administrative institutions on 
government transparency (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2011). Due to the absence 
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of partisan elections in China, only government size and administrative rank are 
considered in our research. 
 
Government size  
Bigger governments provide more public services, and increase citiz ns’ agency costs 
(Rios, Benito, and Bastida 2013). The above two points, in turn, indicate that recipients 
of services from large governments probably demand more performance information 
(Baber 1983). At the same time, the sheer scale of a large local government may mean 
that incumbents disclose information to bridge the gap between citizens and the 
government (Serrano-Cinca, Rueda-Tomás, and Portillo-Tarragona 2009). Although FT 
has sometimes been found to be worse in large governments (Bastida and Benito 2007), 
bigger governments have greater intellectual and technical capacity for information 
disclosure (Rios, Benito, and Bastida 2013). Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 11: Government size is positively related to FT in Chinese city-level 
governments. 
 
Administrative ranking 
A local government’s administrative power might influence its ability and willingness to 
undertake policy innovations, such as promoting FT (Liu 2008). Under the unitary 
political system of China, different types of city government occupy a higher and lower 
rank within the overall administrative hierarchy (Li et al. 2015; Chung 2008). The highest 
ranking provincial-level city governments (municipalities) have much wider 
administrative responsibilities than the lowest ranking prefectural cities, with fifteen sub-
provincial level cities in between these two administrative ranks having enhanced 
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responsibilities for local economic development and fiscal policy (Yu and Gao 2013; 
Zhu and Zhang 2019). Empirical research indicates that a Chinese city’s administrative 
ranking is positively related to its overall power over administrative decision-making and 
the formulation of socio-economic policies (Li et al. 2015; Chung 2008). Since cities 
with a higher administrative ranking have more responsibilities for information 
disclosure in accordance with their greater power and socio-economic responsibilities, 
we therefore propose: 
 
Hypothesis 12: Administrative ranking is positively related to FT in Chinese city-level 
governments.  
 
Data and sample 
The Chinese context is a particularly interesting one for the study of FT. Budget drafts 
and reports were state secrets in the 1997 version of the Chinese Budget Law. However, 
since the 2000s, anti-corruption drives, e-government initiatives, and openness to foreign 
investment have encouraged the disclosure of fiscal information (Deng, Peng, and Wang 
2013). In May 2014, the new and revised Budget Law stated that public revenues and 
expenditures should be published in four statements: i) the general public budget 
statement; ii) the government fund statement; iii) the state-owned capital operating 
statement; and iv) the social insurance fund statement (Budget Law 2014).  
To evaluate the determinants of FT in Chinese cities, the sample of local 
governments for this study includes all of the four municipalities (provincial level), 15 
sub-provincial cities under separate state planning, and 294 prefecture-level cities5F in 
mainland China.1 Twenty prefecture-level cities are excluded from the sample due to a 
lack of data. However, since more than 90% of the cities have been included, and the 
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excluded cities are small and located in remote areas (e.g. the Tibet, Ningxia and Qinghai 
provinces), the sample is highly representative of the population of Chinese city-level 
governments. 
 
Dependent variable 
For the dependent variable, the study utilises the FT scores from the 2017 Annual Fiscal 
Transparency Report of Chinese City-level Governments, which is produced and made 
publicly available by the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua 
University. Using data mining techniques, publicly accessible fiscal information was 
collected from the websites of all cities and representative counties in mainland China, 
offering the most comprehensive coverage of cities’ fiscal information disclosure for the 
fiscal year of 2016 (Tsinghua University 2017). This information is made available by 
municipalities to the citizens that they serve online or on request.  
Weighted FT scores for cities are calculated according to the amount and quality 
of the fiscal data that could be collected from the websites.2 The maximum possible 
transparency score is 670, so the actual scores are divided by 6.7 to simplify 
interpretation. Table 1 indicates that the FT scores range from 6.04 to 84.63. Although 
more than half of the cities score higher than 50, the standard deviation is quite high 
(17.79), indicating that FT varies considerably across Chinese cities. Two out of three 
normality tests (standard deviation and Kolmogorov-Smirnov) suggest that those scores 
are normally distributed, as is also indicated by the distribution of the scores shown in 
Figure 1. Hence, we use the published FT scores for our analysis. 
 
[Figure 1] 
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Independent variables 
Regarding independent variables, data for the year of 2016 are collected from the 2017 
provincial and city statistical yearbooks, edited by the Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics and provincial statistical departments. Such data have been used in previous 
studies (e.g. Cheung and Lin 2004). 
Following Grigorescu (2003) and Hameed (2005), GDP per capita (GDPPC) is 
our measure of economic development. Economic openness i  measured by dividing FDI 
by GDP (FDIGDP), as per previous studies (e.g. Deng, Peng, and Wang 2013; Hameed 
2005). Unemployment is directly measured as the percentage of registered unemployed 
among the total labour force in a city (UNEMP).  
Following previous studies (e.g. Bolívar, Muñoz, and Hernández 2013), the 
natural logarithm of a city’s number of urban residents (LNPOP) is chosen as the measure 
of population size. The ratio of a city’s urban residents to the total permanent population 
(URBAN) is then used to measure urbanisation. Since data on citizens’ educational 
achievement for the fiscal year of 2017 are unavailable, the number of a city’s residents 
per 100,000 with an undergraduate or higher degree (EDU) is adopted, using information 
published in the National Population Census Report of 2010. The percentage of internet 
users among the permanent resident population is calculated using figures from the 
Chinese provincial statistical yearbooks to capture int rnet usage (INTERNET). 
Fiscal deficit is represented by the deficit ratio, which is total public finance 
expenditure minus public finance revenue divided by a city’s GDP (DEFICIT). 
Dependence on transfer payments (TPRATIO) is calculated as the number of 
unconditional transfer payments a city receives from higher-level governments divided 
by the sum of a city’s public finance revenues and total transfer payment revenues.3 The 
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ratio of non-tax income to total fiscal income is used to measure overall reli nce on non-
tax revenues (NONTAX). 
The natural logarithm of each city’s spending on general administration is used 
to measure government size (LNGOVSIZE) due to the high skewness of the raw figures 
(skewness = 4.38). Following previous studies (e.g. Li et al. 2015; Yang, Lei, and Li 
2019), two dummy variables for administrative rank are adopted (RANK1 and RANK2). 
For RANK1, “1” is given to municipalities and “0” to all other cities. For RANK2, “1” 
is given to sub-provincial level cities, and “0” to all other cities. Finally, the potential 
effects of region on FT are controlled by creating a dichotomous variable (EAST) coded 
‘1’ for cities in the more-developed eastern part of China, and ‘0’ for those in the Western 
part. 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1. Correlations are shown in Table 1A in 
the Appendix. The final regression model is as follows: 
 
FTi = α + β1GDPPCi + β2FDIGDPi + β3UNEMPi + β4LNPOPi + β5URBANi + β6EDUi + 
β7INTERNETi + β8DEFICITi + β9TPRATIOi + β10NONTAX i + β11LNGOVSIZEi + 
β12RANK1i + β13RANK2i + β14EASTi + μi  
 
[Table 1] 
 
Statistical results 
The results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression modelling are shown in Table 2. 
Because the data are cross-sectional, autocorrelation is not an issue (Andrews 1991). 
Severe multicollinearity is not a problem as the Variance Inflation Factor values are all 
below 10, with most smaller than 3.5 (Lind, Marchal, and Wathen 2010) – see final 
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column in Table 2. Robust estimation of standard errors counters heteroscedasticity 
(Long and Ervin 2000).   
 
[Table 2] 
  
The R-squared value is 0.395, suggesting about 40% of the variation in FT in 
Chinese cities can be predicted by the independent variables included in the regression 
model. GDPPC, FDIGDP, LNPOP, INTERNET, TPRATIO, and RANK2 are 
statistically significant determinants of FT.4 To understand the substantive contributions 
of the different independent variables, the Shapley-value decomposition method is 
applied to the regression results (see Li , Ran, and Wang 2007). Since this method can 
only decompose 11 independent variables at a time, the variables with the largest p-
values (NONTAX, RANK1, and EAST) were excluded from the analysis. Table 3 
therefore depicts the contributions to FT made by 11 of the 14 original explanatory 
variables. 
 
[Table 3] 
  
Column 2 displays the Shapley values of the contributions made by the 
explanatory variables to the R-squared value (0.395), while column 3 presents the 
percentage contributions. Nearly half of the model’s contribution to FT (50.04%) is 
attributable to the variable INTERNET, followed by LNPOP (15.10%), both 
demographic features of an area. Additionally, TPRATIO, LNGOVSIZE, and DEFICIT 
each account for more than 4% of the model’s explanatory power, in which DEFICIT 
and LNGOVSIZE is statistically insignificant. The contributions of FDIGDP, RANK2, 
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GDPPC, and EDU account for 3.79%, 3.46%, 3.45%, and 3.03% respectively, with 
FDIGDP, RANK2, and GDPPC also being statistically significant.  
 
Discussion 
Six explanatory variables appear to be important determinants of FT in Chinese city-
level governments: GDPPC, FDIGDP, LNPOP, INTERNET, TPRATIO, and RANK2. 
Two of these variables are economic determinants (GDPPC and FDIGDP), two are 
demographic (LNPOP and INTERNET), and the other two are fiscal (TPRATIO) and 
institutional (RANK2) determinants.  
    The finding for GDPPC, suggests that economic development has a statistically 
significant and negative relationship with FT – a result consistent with hypothesis 1 and 
the arguments of Harrison and Sayogo (2014). The coefficient value (-0.0000996) 
indicates only a small substantive relationship between GDPPC and the FT scores. 
Nevertheless, this finding accords with a legitimacy theory perspective on FT in China, 
with city governments regarding economic growth as sufficient to maintain legitimacy 
(Monshipouri, Welch, and Egoávil 2011), rather than as a precondition for increasing 
transparency to reduce agency problems as in most previous empirical studies (e.g. 
Cicatiello, Simone, and Gaeta 2017; Grigorescu 2003).  
    According to the results for FDIGDP, a significant and negative relationship exists 
between economic openness and FT, contrary to hypothesis 2. Here, the coefficient value 
(-12.28) suggests a strong substantive relationship. If the ratio of FDI to GDP increases 
by 1% in a Chinese city, the FT score will decrease, on average, by 12.28 points. 
Although this result is opposite to the provincial-level study of Deng, Peng, and Wang 
(2013), it highlights the cultural particularity of the Chinese local context. Weiss (1995) 
explains that informal communication and personal relationships (‘guanxi’ in Chinese) 
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play an important role in connecting business and government in China. Most FDI in 
mainland China comes from countries/regions familiar with Chinese culture and society 
(e.g. Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea; Hofstede and Bond 1988), that may be 
less demanding of fiscal information. In other words, the typical principal-agent 
relationship between governments and investors may not apply in China. 
Although the sign for the coefficient for UNEMP is positive, it does not achieve 
statistical significance – a result contrary to hypothesis 3 and many previous studies (e.g. 
Caamaño-Alegre et al. 2013; Tavares and Cruzc 2017). Nearly all of the selected cities 
have unemployment rates below 4.6%, so the limited impact of this variable is perhaps 
unsurprising.  
Urban population size (LNPOP) has a statistically significant and positive 
relationship with FT – a result consistent with hypothesis 4 and most prior research (e.g. 
Caamaño-Alegre et al. 2013; Rios, Benito, Bastida 2013). The coefficient suggests a 
substantive relationship: FT increases by 3.96 points if LNPOP increases by one unit. 
Moreover, this variable makes the second greatest contribution to the FT model (see 
Table 3), implying, as principal-agent theory predicts, that demand for fiscal information 
and capacity for information disclosure is greater in more populous cities. 
Both urbanisation (URBAN) and EDU are unrelated to FT, meaning hypotheses 5 
and 6 cannot be accepted. These findings can be partially explained by the Chinese 
context, in which agents (citizens) only play limited roles in comparison with the 
principal (the government). By contrast, the coefficient for INTERNET is positive and 
statistically significant, confirming that internet usage is positively related to FT and that 
hypothesis 7 should be accepted. Despite the differences in political and socio-economic 
institutions between China and western countries, this finding mirrors previous studies 
(e.g. Rios, Benito, and Bastida, 2013; Kim, 2007). Moreover, the coefficient value (0.918) 
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represents a sizeable substantive relationship, and the Shapley value (50.04%) indicates 
that INTERNET makes the greatest contribution to variations in FT. Internet usage might 
be a particularly influential determinant of FT because it is associated with greater 
demand for and supply of fiscal information. 
The coefficient for DEFICIT is negative but statistically insignificant, therefore 
Hypothesis 8 cannot be accepted. The positive results from prior research have been 
found in western political systems, where taxpayers and opposition politicians openly 
debate the use of public money b  incumbents (Guillamón, Bastida, and Benito 2011). 
Such electoral pressures do not exist in the Chinese context (Wu and Wang, 2012). 
TPRATIO is significantly and negatively related to FT – a result consistent with 
Hypothesis 8 but contrary to most previous studies (e.g. Bolívar, Muñoz, and Hernández 
2013). Although the coefficient indicates that FT decreases by only 0.27 points if reliance 
on unconditional transfer payments increases by 1%, this may be enough to damage the 
principal-agent relationship between the local government and citizens. The coefficient 
(0.0093) for NONTAX is statistically insignificant, therefore Hypothesis 10 cannot be 
accepted.  
Although the positive value of the coefficient of LNGOVSIZE (0.635) is consistent 
with prior research (e.g. Bastida and Benito 2007; Rios, Benito, and Bastida 2013), it is 
statistically insignificant. Hence, hypothesis 11 is not accepted. The coefficients for 
RANK2 (6.411) and RANK1 (1.371) are both positive, but RANK1 is not statistically 
significant. These results therefore provide partial confirmation of hypothesis 12. It is 
possible that FT is a slightly less important indicator of legitimacy for the highest ranked 
cities due to their closeness to the central government. Qualitative research could 
potentially explore the issue of administrative power, FT and perceived legitimacy in 
more depth. Finally, the coefficient for EAST (0.755), which represents Eastern Chinese 
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cities, is positive but not statistically significant, suggesting that large-scale regional 
effects on cities’ FT are not present within China. 
 
Conclusion 
This quantitative research explored the determinants of FT in Chinese city-level 
governments. Two economic factors (economic development and economic openness), 
two demographic factors (urban population size, and internet usage), one fiscal 
(dependence on transfer payments) and one institutional factor (RANK2 – administrative 
ranking) influence FT. While the results for the demographic, fiscal, and institutional 
factors mirror those from most previous studies undertaken in developed countries, the 
findings for economic factors differ greatly. This divergence can plausibly be attributed 
to the Chinese context, where bureaucrats (agents) have much greater power than citizens 
(principals) and the authorities often prioritize economic performance over transparency 
as means for maintaining legitimacy. Moreover, in the absence of a voter-politician 
relationship, the views of citizens and bureaucrats, as taxpayers and tax-users, should be 
emphasised when applying the principal-agent perspective to Chinese local government. 
This insight may be applicable in other non-western and developing countries. 
In addition to casting light on the applicability of principal-agent and legitimacy 
theory in the Chinese context, the findings of this study can provide useful information 
for citizens and policy-makers in China. Although it might be difficult to involve citizens 
in government activities, many of them are now able to communicate with local 
legislators via the internet (Yan and Ting 2018). As such, the findings for the positive 
effect of internet usage on FT suggest that policy-makers and legislators in China can 
seek to improve FT in city governments by taking measures to increase the degree of 
internet penetration within the jurisdictions that they serve. 
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Despite its strengths, the study has some limitations, which could be addressed in 
future studies. Firstly, a cross-sectional research design is employed using the most 
recent and complete FT scores. As information quality and availability improves, 
longitudinal research designs could establish a more robust causal relationship between 
different factors and FT. Secondly, the impact of the personal characteristics of local 
bureaucrats (e.g. educational background, previous work experiences) were not 
incorporated within the study due to the difficulty of collecting comprehensive data on 
the background of Chinese bureaucrats across almost 300 cities. This is something that 
could form the basis for smaller, more focused research designs using samples of city 
governments or bureaucrats with responsibility for complying with the Budget Law. 
Finally, it would be valuable in the future to conduct comparative studies of the 
determinants of FT in local governments in developed and developing countries across 
the world.  
In sum, this study has provided vital information on the determinants of FT in 
Chinese city-level governments. To drive further improvements in our understanding of 
this key issue, a research agenda explicitly addressing approaches to promoting FT and 
its effects would prove invaluable.  
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Notes
1. There are five main subnational administrative divisions in China. The highest level 
includes the provinces and the four municipalities directly under the Central 
government. Fifteen sub-provincial cities and 294 prefecture-level cities are located at 
the second and third level. Counties, townships, and villages are classified into the third, 
fourth, and fifth levels. Cities in this study therefore refer to municipalities, sub-
provincial and prefecture-level cities.  
2. The FT report classifies fiscal information into the following four categories: i) bas c 
information on the city government and public institutions (maximum possible score = 
50); ii) annual budget plan and the budget report for the last fiscal year (maximum 
possible score = 340); iii) other significant fiscal information such as audit reports 
(maximum possible score = 250); and, iv) the three advanced principles - the ‘one-stop 
service’ principle, the ‘sufficiency’ principle, and the ‘user-friendly’ principle 
(maximum possible score = 30). 
      3. A city’s transfer payment revenues in China include revenues from unconditional 
transfer payments (‘general transfer payments’ or financial grants in Chinese), specific 
transfers (grants for specific projects or purposes), and tax rebates (Zhang and Wu 
2009). Transfer payment revenues are not included in public finance revenue and are 
listed separately in financial statements. 
4. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test suggests that all the explanatory variables are 
exogenous. However, previous studies (e.g. Hameed 2005) found that a high level of FT 
in governments can bring in more foreign investment. Hence, to evaluate in more depth 
whether the relationship between FT and FDIGDP is endogenous, the values for 
FDIGDP for 2016, 2015, and 2014 were employed as instrumental variables in a 2-stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) regression model. The F statistic derived from the first stage of 
the 2SLS regression is large enough to prove that the three instrumental variables were 
highly correlated with the potentially endogenous variable, but the subsequent DWH test 
did not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, meaning that we find no evidence of an 
endogenous relationship between FDI and FT. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Min  Max  Sd  Skewness  
FT 49.85 6.040 84.63 17.73 -0.369 
GDPPC 53,650 11,892 215,488 31,513 1.640 
FDI (in 10,000USD) 91,906 0 1,851,378 203,135 4.745 
FDIGDP 0.236 0 1.403 0.248 1.526 
UNEMP 2.694 0.290 13.51 1.893 -0.353 
POP 1,729,030 150,000 30,484,300 2,841,081 6.810 
LNPOP 13.95 11.92 17.23 0.797 0.736 
URBAN 56.01 30.48 100 13.20 0.920 
EDU 7,973 986 31,499 4,883 1.833 
INTERNET 21.44 4.749 79.16 9.937 2.161 
DEFICIT 12.90 -0.730 80.57 10.39 2.036 
TPRATIO 29.98 0.371 72.38 13.90 -0.256 
NONTAX 32.44 8.100 59.44 9.837 0.219 
GOVSIZE 384,878 21,954 3.672e+06 416,208 4.376 
LNGOVSIZE 12.57 9.997 15.12 0.716 0.429 
RANK1 0.014 0 1 0.120 8.140 
RANK2 0.051 0 1 0.220 4.104 
EAST 0.4332 0 1 0.497 0.270 
N=277
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Table 2 Determinants of Financial Transparency in Chinese City Governments  
 
Factors Variables Model  p-value VIF 
Economic  GDPPC -9.96e-05** 0.028 3.83 
  (4.51e-05)   
 UNEMP 0.260 0.646 1.23 
  (0.556)   
 FDIGDP -12.28*** 0.000 1.32 
  (3.333)   
Demographic  LNPOP 3.962** 0.039 2.66 
  (1.915)   
 URBAN -0.137 0.152 2.01 
  (0.0956)   
 EDU -0.000248 0.321 3.22 
  (0.000249)   
 INTERNET 0.918*** 0.000 1.69 
  (0.236)   
Fiscal  DEFICIT -0.133 0.355 2.51 
  (0.144)   
 TPRATIO -0.273** 0.036 4.44 
  (0.130)   
 NONTAX 0.00927 0.932 1.53 
  (0.109)   
Institutional  LNGOVSIZE 0.635 0.711 2.27 
  (1.712)   
 RANK1 1.372 0.901 1.66 
  (11.00)   
 RANK2 6.411* 0.090 1.77 
  (3.765)   
 EAST -0.614 0.759 1.39 
  (2.003)   
 Constant -6.337 0.823  
 F(14, 262) 16.32   
 Observations 277   
 R-squared 0.395   
p values*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. 
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Table 3 Shapley-value decomposition 
Variable    Shapley value (estimate) Percent (estimate) 
INTERNET*** 0.19735 50.04 % 
LNPOP** 0.05956 15.10 % 
TPRATIO** 0.02866 7.27% 
LNGOVSIZE 0.02609 6.62% 
DEFICIT 0.01877 4.76% 
FDIGDP*** 0.01494 3.79% 
RANK2* 0.01363 3.46% 
GDPPC** 0.01359 3.45% 
EDU 0.01194 3.03% 
URBAN 0.00739 1.87% 
UNEMP 0.00242 0.61% 
TOTAL 0.39436  
p values*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1 Distribution of FT scores 
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Appendix 
Table 1A Correlations  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. FT 1              
2 GDPPC 0.249** 1             
3. UNEMP -0.111* -0.228** 1            
4. FDIGDP 0.0271 0.314** -0.0320 1           
5. LNPOP 0.419** 0.388** -0.101* 0.224** 1          
6. URBAN 0.181** 0.619** -0.0799 0.194** 0.307** 1         
7. EDU 0.266** 0.697** -0.0305 0.292** 0.485** 0.621** 1        
8. INTERNET 0.559** 0.524** -0.197** 0.224** 0.451** 0.432** 0.508** 1       
9. DEFICIT -0.297** -0.638** 0.248** -0.336** -0.454** -0.439** -0.446** -0.414** 1      
10. TPRATIO -0.337** -0.804** 0.215** -0.396** -0.472** -0.621** -0.666** -0.529** 0.726** 1     
11. NONTAX -0.213** -0.419** 0.248** -0.203** -0.354** -0.292** -0.397** -0.329** 0.405** 0.476** 1    
12. LNGOVSIZE 0.336** 0.450** -0.225** 0.297** 0.671** 0.257** 0.402** 0.419** -0.405** -0.478** -0.311** 1   
13. RANK1 0.194** 0.199** -0.0411 0.175** 0.448** 0.142** 0.296** 0.306** -0.0847 -0.172** -0.0906 0.386** 1 
 
14. RANK2 0.246** 0.374** -0.0611 0.252** 0.406** 0.302** 0.489** 0.333** -0.216** -0.353** -0.280** 0.408** -0.0279 1 
15. EAST 0.178** 0.290** -0.0209 -0.0170 0.270** 0.269** 0.144** 0.265** -0.257** -0.273** -0.352** 0.141** 0.169** 0.213** 
p values*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
